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Abstract 
 This paper is an attempt to analyze the effects of education institutions on the 
achievement of immigrant students in 31 high immigration countries. The role of education 
institutions on immigrant population has not been examined systematically in the literature. 
This paper aims at filling out this gap by assessing the effect of institutional arrangements in 
the educational system of host countries. Using OLS procedures with the 2003, 2006 and 
2009 PISA datasets, we show that achievement gaps are wider for the immigrant students in 
the host countries where the school starting age is late. Likewise, the expected duration of 
preprimary education is a key determinant on the scores of the immigrant students since it can 
increase the gap between the natives and immigrants if the immigrants are deprived of 
attending to preprimary education. The tracking system definitely results in the increase of 
inequality between immigrant and native students. We also figure out that the time spent in 
the educational system of a host country is a crucial determinant on the achievement of 
immigrant students and it affects their performance positively. Moreover, the language 
spoken at home and the age of arrival to a host country have also notable effect on the 
immigrant performance. In addition, country specific effects such as HDI, income inequality, 
education spending, pupil-teacher ratio and teacher salary rates are also important factors for 
immigrant educational outcomes. The inequality between the immigrant and native students is 
reproduced through the institutional arrangements that are designed without sufficient 
consideration. 
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EĞĠTĠM KURUMLARI VE GÖÇMENLERĠN OKUL BAġARISI: ÜLKELERARASI 
BĠR ANALĠZ 
YaĢar Ersan 
Ekonomi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2013 
Tez DanıĢmanı: Abdurrahman B. Aydemir 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Göçmen öğrenciler, eğitim kurumları, ilköğretim, okul öncesi eğitim, 
ilköğretim baĢlangıç yaĢı, yönlendirme (seçilim)   
Özet 
Bu çalıĢma 31 ülkede göçmenlerin eğitim baĢarısının eğitim kurumlarıyla iliĢkisini 
analizine yönelik bir çabadır. Eğitim kurumlarının göçmen nüfusu üzerindeki rolü literatürde 
sistematik bir Ģekilde incelenmemiĢtir. Bu çalıĢma, ülkelerdeki eğitim düzenlemelerinin 
göçmenler üzerindeki etkisini araĢtırarak bu boĢluğu doldurmaya çalıĢmaktadır. 2003, 2006 
ve 2009 PISA veri setleri yardımı ile yapılan Sıradan En Küçük Kareler Yöntemi analizi , 
okula baĢlama yaĢının geç olduğu ülkelerde göçmen ve yerli öğrenciler arasındaki farkın 
göçmen öğrenciler aleyhine artmakta olduğunu göstermektedir. Buna ek olarak,  göçmen 
öğrenciler okul öncesi eğitimden yoksun kalırlarsa beklenen okul öncesi eğitim süresi göçmen 
ve yerli öğrenciler arasındaki farkı artırmaktadır. Yönlendirme ya da seçilim mekanizması 
kesin bir Ģekilde aradaki farkı göçmenler aleyhine artırmaktadır. Ayrıca, eğitim sistemi içinde 
geçirilen zaman süresi önemli bir faktör ve göçmen öğrencileri ekstra pozitif etkilemektedir.  
Evde konuĢulan dil, ülkeye kaç yaĢında gelindiği göçmen öğrencilerin baĢarısı üzerinde kayda 
değer bir etkiye sahiptir. HDI seviyesi, gelir dağılımındaki eĢitsizlik, öğrenci-öğretmen oranı, 
eğitim harcamaları gibi ülkeye özgü değiĢkenler göçmen öğrencilerin baĢarısı için ayrıca 
önemli faktörlerdir. Göçmen ve yerli öğrenciler arasındaki eĢitsizlikler yeterince önem 
verilmeden yapılan kurumsal düzenlemelerle yeniden üretilmektedir.  
 
 
 
vii 
 
CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Previous Studies ................................................................................................................ 5 
3. Data and Estimation Method ......................................................................................... 12 
3.1. Analysis Sample ............................................................................................................ 12 
3.2. Measurement of PISA test Scores ................................................................................. 16 
3.3. Measurement of Educational Institutions ...................................................................... 18 
3.4. The Method of Estimation ............................................................................................. 19 
4. Results .............................................................................................................................. 21 
4.1. The gap between the immigrants and the natives .......................................................... 21 
4.2. The Institutions .............................................................................................................. 25 
4.3 Age of arrival, Language and Country Specific Characteristics .................................... 37 
5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 40 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................. 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Region of Migration and Immigrant Status .............................................................. 14 
Table 2: The distribution in terms of immigration status in the host countries ....................... 15 
Table 3: Score distribution for each immigrant group ............................................................ 17 
Table 4: The regression results for the nativity gap. ............................................................... 24 
Table 5: The regression results of institutions in the domain of reading ................................ 26 
Table 6: The regression results of institutions in the domain of science ................................ 27 
Table 7:  The regression results of institutions in the domain of math ................................... 28 
Table 8: The regression results of new preprimary variable in the domain of science ........... 31 
Table 9: The regression results of new preprimary variable in the domain of math ............... 32 
Table 10: The regression results of new preprimary variable in the domain of reading ......... 33 
Table 11: The regression results for school characteristics and country level variables ........ 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed high levels of immigration to industrialized countries 
therefore the educational achievement of immigrant population in host countries is an 
increasingly important issue. The inequality in education between immigrants and natives 
influences labor market outcomes and the integration of immigrants within host countries. 
Moreover, the integration of immigrant populations is crucial for ensuring social cohesion in 
the host countries. The immigrants carry their wealth of human capital to host countries 
however if this wealth is not utilized efficiently it may negatively contribute to the economic 
welfare and cultural diversity of the host countries. As a result, the integration of immigrants 
to the host country is a major issue for policy makers. 
Although immigrant students often underperform at significant levels compared with 
their native counterparts, the immigrants are better than their native peers in some host 
countries. Thus, the educational outcome of immigrant students is varying between the host 
countries. For instance, immigrants that emigrate from the same country have different 
educational outcomes in the different host countries and these differences are significantly 
great (Stanat et al. (2006)).  The educational achievement of immigrant students has been 
discussed extensively so far. Studies on immigrants in the economics literature are recently 
increasing and drawing attention (Aydemir et al. (2008), Gang and Zimmermann (2000), and 
Bauer and Riphahn (2007)).  However, we know little about the main determinants of the 
facts above. The educational outcome of immigrants appears to be determined by the factors 
related to family background and school characteristics. In addition to family background and 
school characteristics, differences in the educational outcomes of immigrant students may be 
connected to institutional structures of the host countries in education. 
This article focuses on 31 OECD countries that contain significant heterogeneity in the 
institutional structures related to education. In particular, we study the effect of 1) the primary 
school starting age, 2) preprimary education, 3) the time spent in a tracking system 4) the time 
spent in the education system of a host country, and investigate whether these institutional 
arrangements have distinct effects on the natives and immigrant students. 
There may be various reasons behind the differences between the immigrant and 
native students as well as the differences among the immigrant students in different host 
countries.  Firstly, the effect of family background  may be a reason for this variation since 
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students from high socioeconomic status families outperform, through their greater access to 
educational resources, relative to their low family background peers (Schuetz et al.(2008), 
Ludemann and Schwerdt(2010), Schnepf(2007), and Brunello and Checchi(2007)).  Secondly, 
the distinction between the immigrant and native students appears to be partly driven by the 
skill differences in the language of a host country owing to the fact that the low language 
ability is decreasing the cognitive capacities of immigrant students (Schnepf (2007)). Apart 
from these facts, the institutional arrangements in education are key mechanisms that 
determine the educational achievement of both immigrant and native peers. 
The variation in the duration of preprimary education in the host countries is the first 
institutional characteristic that significantly influences the educational outcomes of the 
students including immigrant students (Schuetz et al. (2008), Schneeweis (2011), Datar 
(2006), Lubotsky (2009) and Deming et al. (2008)).  The duration of preprimary education 
may improve the educational outcomes of both natives and immigrants for several reasons. 
For instance, the language ability of immigrant students may improve and the future negative 
effect of the obstacle of language may diminish (Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzar (2011), 
Schneeweis (2011)). Consequently, we expect that the longer period of preprimary education 
improves the educational achievement of both native and immigrant students. Similarly, 
entering school early may influence the students positively, especially those from low family 
background. The negative effect of family background may be eliminated if they have the 
access to educational resources and environment early (Cobb-Clark et al. (2012)). As a result, 
the early school starting age is expected to advance the educational outcomes of immigrant 
students due to providing familiarity with the language of the host country and diminishing 
the negative effect of family background. Furthermore, the existence of any kind of tracking 
i.e. selection of students
1
, can affect the educational outcomes of the students. The tracking 
may increase the inequality in score distribution between immigrants and natives. In addition 
it may have detrimental effect on educational outcomes in terms of family background 
including the fact that the lower family background students are affected more negatively 
from the tracking system (Hanushek and Woessman (2006), Schuetz et al. (2008), Cobb-
Clark et al. (2012), Dronkers and Velden (2012), Horn (2012), Korthals (2012), and Brunello 
and Checchi (2007)).  In contrast to the claim of negative effect of a tracking system on 
                                                          
1
 For more details for conceptualization of tracking, see the part of the Previous Studies. 
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inequality in educational outcomes, Waldinger (2006) figures out that the tracking has no 
effect on inequality. Consequently, the effect of tracking system is ambiguous however we 
expect that it has a negative effect on the educational achievement of the immigrant students. 
Thus, the application process of tracking may not take into account that the immigrant 
students have both socioeconomic and cultural disadvantages. For instance, the immigrant 
students may drop into lower track because of their language and low family background 
conditions. Apart from these factors, we control for the time a student spent in the educational 
system of host country and we expect that as the time spent in education system increases the 
student perform better. As an example, the negative effects of cultural adaptation and 
institutional unfamiliarity may diminish as the time passes in the host country.  On the whole, 
it seems plausible that each of institutions determine the educational achievement of both 
native and immigrant students. In this study, we test whether these educational institutions 
have distinct effects for the natives and the immigrants. Moreover, we test whether they are 
efficient
2
 mechanisms to increase the performance of students. 
This article contributes to the literature in several ways: firstly, the previous literature 
that investigates the effect of institutions conducts analysis focuses on single characteristics of 
an educational system. For instance, Dronkers and Velden (2012), Horn (2012), Brunello and 
Checchi (2007), and Hanushek and Woessman (2006) investigate the effect of tracking 
without considering other institutional mechanisms and the status of immigration. By 
conducting an analysis covering all potential institutional mechanisms, we go beyond these 
studies. Secondly, while similar to our study Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) investigates the effects 
of educational institutions on immigrant youth, due to model specification this study can 
measure effect of institutional characteristics on immigrants only but not natives. Our study 
focuses on the effects of institutional characteristics on both natives and immigrants. Thirdly, 
the previous studies are not considering the fixed effects of region of origin, i.e. the region of 
emigration, (Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), Horn (2012), Schnepf (2007), Schneeweis (2011)). 
This study takes into account differences in source country composition of immigrants while 
investigating the effects of institutions on immigrant students. These differences are important 
since, for instance, the region of origin may accelerate the adaptation of immigrant students to 
                                                          
2
 Efficiency is capturing the fact that whether a mechanism consistently increases the 
performance of students. If the tracking mechanism increases the scores of students then we 
call tracking “an efficient” mechanism. 
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the host country for several reasons (e.g. ethnic discrimination).  Fourthly, we investigate the 
effect of time spent in the educational system of a host country, which is a crucial determinant 
of success for the immigrant students. Moreover, we also contribute to the literature by using 
a different construction for tracking. We use the time spent in a track to investigate the effect 
of tracking on the students since the effect of tracking occurs in time. Finally, this article takes 
the advantage of three waves of PISA (2003, 2006, and 2009) by pooling data across years by 
using the institutional heterogeneity in 31 OECD countries. 
Our results confirm that the institutional mechanisms in the educational system of a 
host country have a remarkable effect on the educational achievements of immigrant students 
in addition to playing a key role in the variation of educational outcomes of OECD countries 
when considering the achievements of the native population of each country. Particularly, the 
preprimary education, tracking, school starting age and the time spent in the education system 
of a host country are decisive factors on the educational integration of an immigrant 
population. 
The next section reviews the previous literature regarding the immigrants and their 
educational achievements, the institutional arrangements in the host countries. Section 3 
describes the data and presents graphical evidences and sketches our empirical approach. 
Results and robustness test are given in section 4 and finally section 5 concludes the article. 
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2. Previous Studies 
When considering the literature on the relationship between school tracking and 
educational achievement, one has to remember that the word „tracking‟ refers to the presence 
of different curricula with an academic and a vocational emphasis, and that students are 
assigned into schools that specialize in each curriculum in Europe (Brunello and Checchi 
(2007), p.787). However, in the USA tracking represents ability streaming within a 
comprehensive school system. In the US, the students are not streamed before their stage of 
high school in fact they are separated into groups during the stage of high school in terms of 
ability level of a student.  In Europe, the tracking almost refers to existence of a system that 
separates the students into different high schools such as assigning some into vocational 
schools or some into general high school. 
The current empirical literature covers both country specific and cross-country 
analysis of the relationship between school tracking and educational achievement of 
individuals. The results on this relationship have not produced a consensus to date regarding 
the effects of tracking on educational achievement. The current literature tries to identify the 
effect of tracking systems on the educational achievement of students by considering all 
students, immigrant students and both, dividing them into separate samples. The studies 
covering the effects of tracking system on immigrant students in high immigration countries 
will be briefly described in the subsection below, as well as, the studies conducting an 
analysis that only covers immigrants. 
The disadvantage of immigrant students in the education systems of host countries 
leads to detrimental influence for the future labor market decisions of immigrants. Kahn 
(2004) inquiries into the topic of skills of immigrants and employment by using a sample 
consisting of OECD countries like New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland and US. The measure 
of labor-market outcomes is the employment probability of immigrant individual through a 
cross-section analysis. Controlling for skills he reaches the conclusion that immigrants have 
lower cognitive skills than natives in each country, with the largest gaps in the US, and the 
smaller gaps in Canada and New Zealand. Hence, the examination of tracking and its effects 
on immigrants‟ educational success -which is the sign of skill characteristic for the worker in 
the labor-market according to economic theory-, is an inspiring topic of investigation given 
the potential negative effect of tracking on immigrant students. 
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Firstly, we will consider the studies which do not consider the status of immigration 
between immigrant and native students. By assuming tracking is implemented efficiently, 
Korthals (2012) finds evidence that equality of opportunity is best provided in a system with 
many tracks. This study carries out a random effect model analysis using the PISA 2009 
dataset including 185000 students in 31 comparable countries. This paper contributes to the 
literature of tracking as follows. First, tracking is defined as number of school types or 
distinct educational programs available to 15 years old students; however tracking at earlier 
stages of education is not considered. Second, unlike the previous studies the school 
characteristics and country level variables are controlled by using a three-level random effect 
model which is based on individual, school and country level. Finally, the study is 
considering both the issue of performance and the equality of opportunity by using the test 
score in reading, math and science of students as the measure of achievement. 
In terms of the equity effects, Waldinger (2006) uses a differences-in-differences 
approach to study the effects of tracking on family background
3
 by using the datasets PISA 
2003, TIMMS (1999) and PIRLS (2001). He identifies the tracking as the grade of first 
tracking in his student level analysis by considering 27 OECD countries. He tries to 
understand the relation between family background and tracking using math and reading 
scores as measures of achievement. As a result, he finds the following two results: First, he 
concludes that family background is more important in the countries where students are 
tracked in at an early age. Second, he finds evidence that family background has no 
importance after actual tracking has been implemented. Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) 
investigate the topic of early tracking and inequality of opportunity by using the datasets of 
PISA 2000 and 2003, PIRLS (2001) and TIMMS (1995, 1999, and 2003) for several years 
including 45 countries. They use a pooled data and carry out differences-in-differences 
method including a country level analysis. Standard deviation in math, science and reading 
                                                          
3
 In general, selection is influenced, directly or indirectly, by family background. For 
example, better-educated parents are more likely to send their children in a general track, 
which results in university participation. On the other hand, blue collar families send theirs to 
vocational school. Even the allocation requires a formal test, students from better educated 
families are more likely to enter the academic track, either because of their cognitive ability or 
genes or because of the results of their environment. 
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test scores is used as a measure of equity and age of first tracking as measure of institutions 
for tracking. They conclude that early tracking has significant effect on inequality and no 
clear effect on efficiency. 
Brunello and Checchi (2007) investigate the topic of school tracking and equality of 
opportunity using a student level analysis through the datasets of PISA 2003, IALS (1994, 
1996, and 1998), ISSP (1999) and ECHP (1995-2000) including nearly 30 countries. Even 
though their scope of research does not cover immigrants and their achievements, they 
estimate the OLS, the probit and the multinomial logit models and thus they contribute to the 
literature that tracking strengthens family background effects for formal education but 
weakens them for on the job learning. Their paper is important in two respects: first, tracking 
may have negative effect on individuals with poor family background. Secondly, while 
considering the overall living conditions of immigrant populations in OECD countries relative 
to the natives we can predict that the family background effect probably leads to detrimental 
results for the immigrant students. We try to address this issue in this paper. In addition to the 
study of Brunello and Checchi (2007) including the interaction between tracking and family 
background, Schuetz et al. (2008) also investigate the topic of equality of opportunity in the 
scope of tracking and its interaction with family background effect. Conducting a weighted 
clustering-robust linear regression (WCRLR) and a country fixed effect analysis on the 
datasets of TIMMS and TIMMS-R with 54 countries- they conclude that late tracking and 
pre-school duration reduce the impact of family background, which is a significant result for 
our study since one of our hypotheses is that early tracking increases the negative effect of 
poor family living conditions and of social class effect for immigrant students. 
In addition to the studies above, there are additional studies whose scope specifically 
considers the immigrants‟ success and the effect of tracking systems in host countries. Cobb-
Clark et al. (2012) use the PISA 2009 dataset, where they consider the effect of institutions in 
host countries on the immigrants. Their sample is composed of 34 OECD countries. Hence, 
they use an OLS method including country fixed effects. They find that achievement gaps are 
larger for immigrant students that arrive at older ages and those who do not speak the test 
language at home by conducting a student level analysis based on reading, math and science 
scores as the measures of achievement. They conclude that early age of starting school help 
immigrant youths in some cases but not for all. In addition to their consideration of 
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immigrants, their paper is unique to my knowledge as it considers tracking and institutional 
determinants. They consider the current ability grouping as the track measure although they 
control for the age first selection. However, in our study unlike the concern of Cobb-Clark et 
al. (2012) we are focusing on the effect of tracking by considering the previous track history 
of a student. In particular, we are investigating the fact that whether previous selection or 
tracking affects the performance of a student positively or negatively. Their result about the 
issue of tracking is that limited tracking (i. e. ability grouping in current school) on ability is 
advantageous for the immigrant students although complete tracking is detrimental. 
Compared to previous research in the area of immigrant‟s educational achievement, 
the contribution of Dronkers and Velden (2012) is that they explicitly include track level and 
school level as independent units of analyses, which leads to more accurate results of the 
effects of characteristics of the educational system. Their sample based on PISA 2006 consists 
of 15 countries, 8251 student level observations including only immigrant students and their 
measure of tracking is the age of selection. The previous studies lack a sufficient design to 
investigate the effects of immigrants‟ countries of origin and destination as these relate to 
their final educational achievement. They use a hierarchical linear mode including three 
levels- students, country and track level- they conclude that first generation immigrants are 
more successful in comprehensive education systems relative to the systems based on 
tracking. 
Horn (2012) uses a mixed random effect model (two-level Hierarchical Linear Model) 
using the PISA 2003 dataset and his measure of achievement is the literacy score of students. 
The level of analysis is based on student and country level as two separate levels. Moreover 
this study includes an immigrant dummy regarding first and second generation. The measure 
of institutions for tracking is defined as the age of first selection and this study unlike the 
previous ones concentrate on both performance and inequality of opportunity. Thus, this 
paper contributes to the literature that early age of selection links closely with high inequality 
of opportunity while the standardization enhances equality.  Although this paper includes both 
immigrant and native students in the sample, it is not particularly related to the issue of 
immigrant disadvantage in OECD countries. 
The study of Ludemann and Schwerdt (2010) shows that second generation 
immigrants face additional disadvantages with respect to grades and teacher recommendations 
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during the transition to secondary school in the German education system that involves tracks. 
They use the micro data, German extension of the Progress in International Reading Literacy 
Study (PIRLS-E) 2001, by carrying out an analysis based on multinomial logit model. This 
econometric model is taking into account a student level analysis which is the probability of 
receiving the teacher recommendation in the transition from primary school to secondary 
school. By testing whether there is an extra inequality of opportunity for 2
nd
 generation 
immigrants in Germany in the education system, they conclude that the socioeconomic 
background of students, which may be called family background effect (FBE), play an 
important role in the transition as the worse conditions of the students‟ social class 
detrimentally result in worse track recommendations. Although the study claims the equality 
of opportunity in the regards of 2
nd
 generation immigrants, the paper ignores the country of 
origin of immigrants and focuses on Germany as opposed to other studies that carry out 
analysis across countries with and without a tracking structure in their education systems. 
Entorf and Miniou (2005) study the effect of immigrant status on the reading score of 
immigrant students using PISA 2000 dataset including 10 OECD countries mainly 
investigating the difference in the reading scores of immigrant students between the 
Continental European countries and New Zealand and Scandinavian countries. By using a 
cross-section OLS method, they find the socioeconomic effect to be highest in Germany, the 
UK and the US in spite of lowest effect in Canada and Scandinavia. According to their study 
language spoken at home is a key factor in explaining this variation. 
Schnepf (2007) studies the immigrants‟ disadvantage in high immigration countries 
using the datasets PISA 2003, TIMMS (1995 and 1999), and PIRLS (2001). This study, as in 
the case of Entorf and Miniou (2005), is based on cross-section OLS by including a sample 
consisting of ten OECD countries. By using math scores of immigrant students, the paper 
contributes to the literature that immigrants are more successful compared to natives in 
English-speaking countries unlike the relative lower performance of immigrants in 
Continental Europe. The determinants of the above result are summarized as language skills, 
socio-economic background, and school segregation. However, this paper does not take into 
account institutional differences between the host countries as well as the country of origin of 
immigrant students. Although this paper includes the segregation as a determinant for the gap 
10 
 
between the natives and the immigrants, the segregation variable is based on residential 
segregation rather than the segregation due to institutional differences. 
In addition to the studies examining the effects of segregation such as Entorf and 
Miniou (2005), and Schnepf (2007), Schneeweis (2010) analyses the topic of educational 
institutions and the integration of immigrants using the datasets of TIMMS, TIMMS-R 2003 
and PISA 2000, 2003. The paper investigates the effects of ethnic segregation in schools, pre-
primary enrollment, and school starting age, instruction time and external exams as the 
measure of institutions. Moreover the unexplained test score gap of immigrants is the measure 
of equity. As a result, this paper comes to the conclusion that the institutions are responsible 
for 20% of immigrant disadvantage, particularly in pre-primary education, young school 
starting age, and low classroom segregation and instruction time. 
It is important to note that host country educational systems and social policy 
institutions may either accentuate or mitigate the effects of tracking systems on the 
educational success of immigrant students emigrating from the same country. The current 
literature generally makes no distinction between immigrant students and the native ones. For 
example Korthals (2012) focuses on all students by creating a sample that makes no 
distinction between the immigrant students and the natives and does not consider the effects 
of school characteristics on outcomes. Therefore the analysis of school level characteristics 
may be a crucial instrument to explain the variation between the score differences of students. 
In addition some studies
4
 find that tracking has no effect on the educational success of 
students regarding equity and efficiency analysis. However, the findings can reverse when 
considering immigrant students. The study of Cobb-Clark (2012) et al. is significant regarding 
their consideration of immigrant students and their achievement however they are not taking 
into account the country of origin of the immigrant students,  ethnic diversity within schools 
or the way that children are allocated to schools. They are not considering the features of 
schools allocated to immigrant students therefore they do not explain the variation of the 
success of same ethnic origin immigrants between different host countries. 
The analysis of Dronkers and Velden (2012) is a remarkable paper as they include the 
region of arrival of immigrants similar to our study. Even though their analysis is unique in 
terms of adding country of origin to their estimation, they are not measuring for the relative 
                                                          
4
 Waldinger (2006) 
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success of immigrants to the natives. As a result, our paper contributes different viewpoints 
than the study of Dronkers et al. (2012) to literature as follows. First, we are focusing on 
success of immigrant students relative to the natives across different host countries taking into 
account ethnic origin of immigrants. Dronkers (2012) conduct their analysis using five broad 
regions for immigrants‟ origins as opposed to this study that considers country of origin. . 
This allows a better control of immigrant heterogeneity and reduces resulting biases. 
Secondly, our dataset is more plentiful relative to their dataset as our sample is composed of 
three PISA datasets including 2003, 2006 and 2009 years. Moreover, our sample employs 
both the data of natives and immigrants to conduct an analysis investigating the relative 
differences between natives and immigrants. Bedard and Dhuey(2006) investigate the topic of 
effects of relative school starting age by using an instrumental variable (IV) method
5
 based on 
the datasets of TIMMS and TIMMS-R. The math and science grade are used as measure of 
achievement in their study and they conclude that the effects of relative school starting age is 
remarkable and sizeable on performance at ages 9 and 13. 
In addition to the study of Dronkers and Velden (2012), the study of Horn (2012) does 
not consider including the variables of language and the country of origin for the same 
immigrant groups. Finally, the exclusion of school starting age and its relation with tracking 
effect is a major obstacle for the result of this paper. The findings of Entorf and Miniou 
(2005) are crucial for our study since our main aim is to explain this variation by considering 
institutional and family level variables. Furthermore, the paper of Schneeweis (2010) is 
crucial in terms of investigating the effects of institutional differences between countries. 
These all studies are important to some extent and our aim is to explain the variation in 
educational achievement of immigrant students across countries. The above studies consider 
generally single or some institutional factors and do not include the institutional factors 
whole. We consider all potential institutional factors in our study and investigate their effects 
on both native and immigrant students. In addition, while doing these we control for the 
source country of immigrants (i.e. region of origin). 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Instrumental variable in their study is age assigned by the cutoff date. 
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3.  Data and Estimation Method 
The student and school level data used in this study come from the 2003, 2006 and 
2009 waves of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), conducted by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The datasets contain 
internationally comparable test scores in reading, math and science as well as information on 
students‟ family background and their schools. The country level datasets are obtained from 
the OECD, Education at a Glance (2005), United Nations Development Program Database 
and the World Bank. 
The first wave of PISA was conducted in 2000, followed by other waves every three 
years with a representative sample from all participating countries covering tests on reading, 
math and science. The results of the tests are standardized to a mean of 500 and a standard 
deviation of 100 for the OECD countries. Moreover, the students and school administrators 
(in some countries also the parents) are surveyed. The number of participating countries 
varies in terms of the test year. For example, 34 OECD countries and 41 partner countries are 
included in the PISA 2009. The economic, institutional and social diversity in the 
participating countries result in heterogeneity that may affect the test results. This study 
covers 31 countries included in the tests in 2003, 2006 and 2009. As a result, the datasets in 
this study is composed of three waves of the PISA tests as a pooled dataset. 
A representative sample
6
 from each participating country is obtained by the OECD in 
two stages: first, schools are selected and, then, students with the target age are selected in the 
chosen schools. The age of students is set to a range of 15 years and three months to 16 years 
and two months. The OECD uses weights to ensure sample representation because not all 
school and students selected were willing to participate and some schools and students were 
oversampled. 
3.1. Analysis Sample 
The sample is pooled and composed of three waves of PISA tests. The first wave is the 
2003 PISA test that includes 131,789 observations after dropping missing observations.  
Secondly, the PISA 2006 part contains 183,056 observations after eliminating missing ones. 
                                                          
6 A two stage stratified sampling design is used by OECD. First a random sample of 
schools is selected and then a random selection of students is chosen from each school. 
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Finally, the PISA 2009 part contains 200,242 observations which results in a total of 515,087 
observations. We eliminated observations that lack information on age, gender, and 
immigrant status or origin country of emigration. The resulting sample of 515,087 students 
comes from nearly 26000 schools in 31 countries. 
The sample includes both the natives and the immigrant students. There are 17,381 
immigrant students, 10,636 of 2
nd
 generation immigrant and 6,745 of 1
st
 generation ones.  We 
classify the students into the following three groups: 1) native born: those born in the country 
of test; 2) first generation immigrant: those not born in the country of test; and 3) second 
generation immigrant: those born in the country of test but whose parent(s) (i.e. both parents) 
were born in another country. By considering the migration status of students, we generated a 
categorical variable in order to conduct an empirical analysis taking into account the country 
of origin for the immigrant student. This categorical variable includes the country of origin 
for the immigrant students in terms of both the country of self-birth for 1
st
 generation 
immigrants and the country of birth of parents for the 2
nd
 generation immigrants. This kind of 
categorization is used in Dronkers et al. (2012) however our categorical variable has more 
regions, which has 15 categories as presented in Table 1 below. This variable helps us control 
the variation in the scores related to the region of origin by including region of origin fixed 
effects. As a result our regions of origin controls are richer than Dronkers et al. (2012). 
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Region of Origin                      Status of Immigration 
Native Second Generation First Generation Total 
Central Africa 0 412 176 588 
Central America 0 80 3 83 
Eastern Asia 0 195 417 612 
Eastern Europe 0 1,331 611 1,942 
Middle East 0 147 99 246 
Native 497,706 0 0 497,706 
North America 0 733 53 786 
Northern Africa 0 124 20 144 
Northern Europe 0 832 517 1,349 
Oceania 0 349 178 527 
South America 0 18 83 101 
Southeast Asia 0 129 151 280 
Southern Africa 0 24 157 181 
Southern Europe 0 3,572 3,373 6,945 
Western Africa 0 20 22 42 
Western Europe 0 2,670 885 3,555 
Total 497,706 10,636 6,745 515,087 
Table 1: Region of Migration and Immigrant Status 
 
The final sample contains observations from 31 OECD countries and the observation 
number per country is summarized in Table 2 below. Some of the countries have no 
immigrant observation; however we include them in the analysis since we are curious about 
the effect of institutions on both native and immigrant populations in terms of equity and 
efficiency
7
 in the educational system. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 The meaning of efficiency in this study is explained in footnote 1. Equity is capturing the 
fact that whether the institutional arrangements increase the gap between the immigrant and 
the natives. 
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                     Status of Immigration  
COUNTRY Native Second Generation First Generation Total 
Australia 8,603 527 633 9,763 
Austria 11,545 642 579 12,766 
Belgium 17,472 696 568 18,736 
Canada 46,745 709 1 47,455 
Czech Rep. 14,843 76 52 14,971 
Denmark 9,504 502 134 10,140 
Estonia 7,452 539 12 8,003 
Finland 14,179 24 45 14,248 
Germany 9,013 608 376 9,997 
Greece 10,066 118 466 10,650 
Hungary 11,233 14 0 11,247 
Iceland 8,697 9 0 8,706 
Ireland 8,784 75 132 8,991 
Italy 44,844 84 4 44,932 
Japan 13,462 2 0 13,464 
Korea 13,509 1 0 13,510 
Luxembourg 6,645 1,543 1,121 9,309 
Mexico 48,073 85 26 48,184 
Netherlands 9,808 418 65 10,291 
Norway 10,170 112 38 10,320 
New Zealand 8,467 441 634 9,542 
Poland 12,973 2 0 12,975 
Portugal 12,657 165 126 12,948 
Spain 42,679 57 0 42,736 
Slovakia 13,848 12 1 13,861 
Slovenia 9,619 436 0 10,055 
Sweden 10,062 143 0 10,205 
Switzerland 20,453 2,375 1,698 24,526 
Turkey 11,081 23 3 11,107 
United Kingdom 24,858 198 31 25,087 
USA 6,362 0 0 6,362 
Total 497,706 10,636 6,745 515,087 
Table 2: The distribution in terms of immigration status in the host countries 
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3.2. Measurement of PISA test Scores 
PISA tests in all three years include five plausible values for each subject -i.e. 
(science, reading and mathematics) - by assigning random numbers drawn from the 
distribution of scores that could be attributed to each individual. The marginal posterior 
distribution is the statistical method that makes a students‟ outcome on any individual test 
random to some extent (see OECD (2012) for more detailed explanation). We construct for 
each individual a test score by averaging five plausible values for each section. The test scores 
have a distribution with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 across countries for 
each section of subject. In our analysis, we restandardize the test scores with mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1 for each year for an easier interpretation of the regression results. 
Moreover this strategy represents the standard deviation changes in the measure of interest 
which are science, math and reading scores in the PISA tests. Table 3 represents the 
distribution of test scores for each section across countries in terms of the immigrant status. 
Generally, the natives have higher score than the immigrants for both the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
generation across countries. The difference in percentage varies between -30% and 10%, 
which is sometimes detrimental results for the immigrants. By looking at the statistics in the 
Table 3, it is verified that there are only 3 countries in reading, 5 in science and 3 in math 
where both the first and the second generation do not underperform the native-born peers. 
Therefore, it is provided that in most of the host countries the immigrants have 
underperformed native-born peers and the gap between them is sometimes detrimental as 
shown in the Table 3. 
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Status of Immigration 
 Native Second Generation First Generation 
COUNTRY Science Reading Math Science Reading Math Science Reading Math 
Australia 529.0707 514.7701 514.4282 557.6208 548.7158 551.0454 537.5703 529.9637 529.1539 
Austria 518.7251 501.4095 519.2193 438.8152 434.754 455.1906 436.0874 443.0395 458.1405 
Belgium 530.9559 527.2654 544.8482 451.3014 453.3051 466.2678 472.7928 475.8748 478.6935 
Canada 521.4896 518.7188 522.2563 518.3485 521.9035 521.1726    
Czech Rep. 538.8475 510.7919 534.6298 480.2895 467.9475 474.1963 520.887 494.6599 524.8113 
Denmark 498.6391 501.0141 516.9456 414.8737 434.064 440.2667 417.9086 428.5616 427.5016 
Estonia 538.8628 511.0438 521.48 497.032 466.0294 487.4174 476.935 463.0798 463.5472 
Finland 554.5359 542.7051 545.398 519.1559 523.9542 509.5469 513.2484 511.0511 521.8719 
Germany 539.7464 520.4307 529.8539 456.6592 452.8629 464.2767 480.3079 471.6949 481.7543 
Greece 480.927 479.4456 462.5436 453.3514 462.0357 447.7028 435.3997 434.6281 418.5837 
Hungary 510.031 493.0313 497.3506 471.7893 453.9712 495.569    
Iceland 495.7345 495.4228 511.6528 446.278 448.28 433.445    
Ireland 512.8064 515.6909 502.1712 513.0041 509.1223 492.0631 526.7518 522.6788 506.6129 
Italy 507.3181 498.396 495.1515 473.8419 507.2343 456.1623 522.301 519.7915 509.978 
Japan 547.1414 514.4233 535.4727 497.5123 390.5603 475.7673    
Korea 534.758 545.7567 547.7531 592.7178 370.9926 549.6884    
Luxembourg 510.6211 505.0631 512.109 454.083 450.7097 468.2529 443.9742 438.5972 458.3484 
Mexico 425.7108 435.2762 427.5205 363.7979 338.3837 350.5495 365.1613 356.4399 363.1196 
Netherlands 543.379 526.0165 548.4172 484.0852 485.9688 497.3166 466.2225 477.1948 489.2777 
New Zealand 540.0096 531.3583 529.5857 515.074 521.5224 513.2062 545.5873 530.1414 546.9432 
Norway 498.4614 502.7281 500.6373 437.6373 454.3889 448.7032 484.9822 490.215 491.9868 
Poland 507.3069 508.3778 500.1919 552.2485 521.3035 514.5583    
Portuguese 483.4008 484.6802 478.9733 466.362 469.6228 451.8481 460.8593 460.8647 453.5796 
Slovakia 501.5997 480.1168 504.9322 442.8848 420.957 449.6079 410.0462 417.9449 386.1895 
Slovenia 501.7382 472.7467 488.7823 453.7461 451.3518 461.0852    
Spain 503.4785 490.8269 503.0411 472.558 456.8621 456.2802    
Sweden 513.7136 517.5438 512.8409 463.1522 484.2052 469.782    
Switzerland 527.4826 512.1606 545.2465 461.8872 462.722 486.4751 435.3148 432.0031 460.911 
Turkey 440.9531 455.5552 435.8326 428.3527 425.1341 443.0265 460.8248 465.0619 445.8171 
United Kingdom 521.2183 506.3815 505.6511 502.5926 503.1451 486.9138 520.2256 501.7725 509.2015 
USA 507.5963 508.1812 495.42       
Table 3: Score distribution for each immigrant group 
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3.3. Measurement of Educational Institutions 
The main concern of this study is to understand the role of educational institutions on 
the variation in the test scores of both the native and immigrant individuals. We are not only 
interested in the role of educational institutions in the host countries on the outcome of 
immigrants, but also we want to investigate the effect of institutions on the native born peers. 
Hence, we can carry out an empirical analysis concerning both efficiency and equity analysis 
since by adding the natives into our analysis we can extract the effect of institutions on them. 
As a result, the analysis may inform policy makers about which institutional arrangements are 
efficient for any country. Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) also explore the role of institutions on the 
outcome of migrant youth. Unlike their empirical strategy focusing only on immigrants we 
have the possibility of investigating the effect of institutions for both the natives and the 
immigrants separately. In our analysis, the measurement of institutional arrangement in a 
quantitative way is based on the inclusion of a series of country level variables that are 
represented in our empirical model. The data for these variables are obtained from OECD and 
EAG (2005), as well as, the World Bank Database. 
Precisely, we generate variables for the primary school-starting age that has three 
categories using the data from the World Bank Database, and the expected total duration of 
pre-primary education in years from OECD Education Database. Moreover, considering the 
age of first selection in country level from EAG (2005) we generate a variable which gives 
the total time a student spends in a specific track. For instance, if a country has the age of 
selection as 10 then the total time a student spends is equal to the age of this student-10. The 
main idea of this construction is based on the fact that the first age of selection endures its 
positive or negative effects on the performance of the student in the whole education program 
after the selection. Besides generating a track variable, we generate a variable -especially 
crucial for the immigrant population- that takes into account the time in years a student 
spends in the education system of a country. For instance, suppose in a country the primary 
school starting age is 5 and the immigrant student comes to this host country at the age of 7 
and he/she is 15 years old while taking the PISA test. Then it is assumed that she has spent 8 
years in the education system of the host country. The adaptation of an immigrant student is 
presumptively increasing as long as the number of years spent in the education system of the 
host country increases. Another equally important institutional variable used in our analysis is 
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the expected pre-primary education in years in a host country. This variable captures exposure 
to school system before the start of primary school. Thus, through above variables we try to 
account for to what extent the student is familiar with the system of the host country as well 
as its culture, including language issues and ability generating processes. 
These variables are not the only characteristics of educational systems that might be of 
interest. Therefore we include variables that try to account for diversity within schools, the 
features of schools plus the method that students are allocated to schools. For this purpose, we 
control the school average family background, teacher shortage, existence of ability grouping, 
school type and the selection method of schools etc. 
In addition to institutional variables describing educational systems, we also control 
for a country‟s economic features including the human development index, Gini coefficient 
on income and employment ratio. Moreover, we also control for the expenditure on education 
such as teacher salary in purchasing power parity term, the ratio of educational expenditure in 
the government budget as well as pupil teacher ratio in order to extract the variation based on 
country specific items. Through these variables, we are trying to account for country specific 
characteristics that may influence student outcomes. The Appendix A shows how the 
institutional structures differ by country. 
3.4. The Method of Estimation 
In our analysis, we are using a linear regression model of the following form: 
                                                                                         
                                                                      
where S is the reading, math or science test of score of a student i in school s of country c.  P 
includes three population indicators that identify the immigrant status i.e. whether the student 
is native-born, 1
st
 generation immigrant or 2
nd
 generation one. Furthermore, I includes 
individual characteristics such as the age, the gender, family background index
8
 ESCS , the 
highest employment category of either parent as well as whether the student is in the upper 
                                                          
8
 ESCS is the index on economic, social and cultural status. The index of ESCS is composed 
of five criteria: highest occupational status of parents (HISEI), highest educational level of 
parents (in years of education according to ISCED), family wealth, cultural possessions and 
home educational resources. 
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secondary education. Our estimation also contains source region of immigration for the 
immigrant population which is indicated by R.  Moreover, we account for the effects of 
institutions on the students‟ scores, and therefore we include the institutional arrangements in 
INS. We interact P with INS in order to observe the effect of institutional arrangements on 
immigrant population, which is the main interest of the paper. As Entorf et al. (2005), 
Schnepf (2007) and Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) suggest the language spoken at home and the 
age of arrival to host country is a key factor to estimate the determinants of immigrant 
success, thus we are controlling these potential determinants in the variable A. 
Our regression analysis also controls for the school characteristics of the students like 
teacher shortage, school average ESCS and the existence of ability grouping etc. therefore the 
vector of SCH is generated. Note that while carrying out this analysis it is impossible to 
control country specific factors due to multicollinearity between institutional characteristics 
and fixed effects. Nevertheless, we aim to control country specific variation by including 
some country level characteristics such as teacher salary in purchasing power parity term, the 
ratio of educational expenditure in the government budget in C. Furthermore, we control for 
the fixed effects of any year by adding dummies for each specific year. Finally, we have the 
error term ε. 
Our baseline model starts with investigating the nativity gap in test scores and the 
following regression results are also summarized in the section of results. As an illustration, 
the first regression includes only immigrant characteristics of the individual as shown in 
Table 4. In spite of our effort in this study, Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) argue that the 
main problem in identifying the causal relationship between host country institutions on 
education success is the possible endogeneity problem due to unobserved country specific 
effects that are correlated with student achievement. Instead of including country specific 
effect as in Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), we include country specific variables in our regression 
analysis in order to identify the effect of institutions on immigrant population relative to 
native ones as well as to make an efficiency analysis across countries in terms of institutions. 
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4.  Results 
4.1. The gap between the immigrants and the natives 
In the first regression reported in Table 4, we are interested in the nativity gap, and 
therefore we only add country specific variables and the population indicators that have the 
reference group of native-born peers. There is a large nativity gap for the immigrants in 
OECD countries for both 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generation immigrants with reference to the native born 
peers. By controlling gender, age, status of secondary education, family background, and the 
highest employment status of family
9
 we find that the 1
st
 generation peers perform 0.265 
standard deviation lower in reading score (see column 2 in Table 4), 0.243 lower in math (see 
column 8 in Table 4) and finally 0.335 in science (see column 5 in Table 4) than the native 
ones and all coefficients are statistically significant. These findings are similar to previous 
studies (Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), Horn (2012), Entorf and Miniou (2005) and Brunello and 
Checchi (2007)). 
Unlike the previous literature (Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), Horn (2012), Ludemann and 
Schwerdt (2010), Entorf and Miniou (2005), Schnepf (2007) and Dronkers and Velden 
(2012)) we carry out an analysis using the region of origin of immigrants in our OLS 
estimation. Needless to say, there is an additional variation in the outcome of immigrants due 
to their region of origin. Thus we are able to extract this variation with the help of this 
estimation strategy that distinguishes this paper from the rest of the literature. One advantage 
of this strategy is that we can explain variations due to the regional and maybe cultural factors 
(such as being from a Christian or Islamic region). Results from this third specification as a 
result of controlling for the region of origin for immigrants shows firstly that in math scores in 
the column 9 in the Table 4 the 1
st
 generation immigrants perform lower than natives by an 
amount of a 0.455 standard deviation, which is lower than the situation of not controlling for 
region of origins. Secondly this trend for the 1
st
 generation applies to the science scores and 
the difference between the natives and 1
st
 generation immigrants increases to a 0.505 standard 
deviation as well as a 0.454 standard deviation for the reading scores (see column 6 and 3 in 
the Table 4). Not only this consistent trend applies to the 1
st
 generation immigrants, it is also 
                                                          
9
 We do not need to use highest educational status of parents since the ESCS includes the 
effect of the educational status of family on the ground that the ESCS and educational 
variable are perfectly correlated. For this reason, we only use ESCS in our regression model. 
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valid for the 2
nd
 generation immigrants. The gap in math scores between the natives and the 
2
nd
 generation immigrants increases to 0.378 standard deviation from 0.268 standard 
deviation after controlling the region of origins (see the column 8 and 9 in the Table 4). 
Besides this, the gap in science and reading scores increases to 0.476 and 0.381 standard 
deviation respectively (see Table 4 for details). To the best of my knowledge, there is no 
study considering regions of origins and its fixed effects for the immigrant students. Therefore 
our study displays that the gap between the natives and the immigrants on average is 
dramatically higher for particular immigrant groups unlike the previous studies Cobb-Clark et 
al. (2012), Horn (2012), Ludemann and Schwerdt (2010), Entorf and Miniou (2005), Schnepf 
(2007), Schneeweis (2010), and Dronkers and Velden (2012). All in all, the gap between the 
immigrants and the natives in education is detrimentally great regardless of the fact that we 
account for the variation due to the region of origins. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Reading Score Reading Score Reading Score Science Score Science Score Science Score Math Score Math Score Math Score 
Second Generation Immigrant -0.536*** -0.275*** -0.381*** -0.637*** -0.375*** -0.476*** -0.536*** -0.268*** -0.378*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0117) (0.0222) (0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0222) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0220) 
First Generation Immigrant -0.501*** -0.265*** -0.454*** -0.568*** -0.335*** -0.505*** -0.481*** -0.243*** -0.455*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0156) (0.0291) (0.0170) (0.0156) (0.0290) (0.0169) (0.0155) (0.0288) 
Gender (Female)  0.347*** 0.347***  -0.0636*** -0.0638***  -0.156*** -0.157*** 
  (0.00245) (0.00245)  (0.00245) (0.00244)  (0.00242) (0.00242) 
ESCS  0.358*** 0.357***  0.372*** 0.371***  0.382*** 0.381*** 
  (0.00180) (0.00180)  (0.00180) (0.00180)  (0.00178) (0.00178) 
AGE  0.138*** 0.139***  0.111*** 0.112***  0.136*** 0.136*** 
  (0.00422) (0.00422)  (0.00422) (0.00422)  (0.00418) (0.00418) 
Upper Secondary  0.306*** 0.307***  0.257*** 0.259***  0.267*** 0.268*** 
  (0.00324) (0.00324)  (0.00324) (0.00324)  (0.00321) (0.00321) 
White collar low skilled parent  -0.0610*** -0.0611***  -0.0386*** -0.0387***  -0.0298*** -0.0298*** 
  (0.00339) (0.00339)  (0.00339) (0.00338)  (0.00336) (0.00335) 
Blue collar high skilled parent  -0.0780*** -0.0764***  -0.0314*** -0.0294***  -0.0223*** -0.0209*** 
  (0.00473) (0.00473)  (0.00473) (0.00473)  (0.00469) (0.00468) 
White collar low skilled parent  -0.0696*** -0.0672***  -0.0242*** -0.0215***  -0.0165*** -0.0144*** 
  (0.00555) (0.00555)  (0.00555) (0.00555)  (0.00550) (0.00550) 
Human Development Index 0.0382*** 0.0815*** 0.0835*** 0.0697*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.0895*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 
 (0.00125) (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00122) (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00122) (0.00122) (0.00122) 
Gini -0.175*** -0.219*** -0.220*** -0.0967*** -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.151*** -0.189*** -0.190*** 
 (0.00232) (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00228) (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00227) (0.00208) (0.00209) 
Pupil teacher  ratio 0.00402*** -0.0142*** -0.0151*** -0.000987 -0.0175*** -0.0187*** 0.00402*** -0.0132*** -0.0141*** 
 (0.000628) (0.000587) (0.000589) (0.000615) (0.000587) (0.000588) (0.000615) (0.000581) (0.000583) 
Education share in government expenditure -0.0981*** -0.0666*** -0.0670*** -0.111*** -0.0814*** -0.0821*** -0.122*** -0.0911*** -0.0918*** 
 (0.00116) (0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00114) (0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00114) (0.00106) (0.00106) 
Public expenditure education per GDP 0.176*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.0699*** 0.00456* 0.00453* 0.121*** 0.0545*** 0.0552*** 
 (0.00301) (0.00273) (0.00274) (0.00295) (0.00273) (0.00274) (0.00295) (0.00270) (0.00271) 
Teacher salary 1.48e-05*** 1.55e-05*** 1.58e-05*** 1.08e-05*** 1.10e-05*** 1.13e-05*** 1.43e-05*** 1.45e-05*** 1.47e-05*** 
 (2.22e-07) (2.03e-07) (2.03e-07) (2.18e-07) (2.03e-07) (2.03e-07) (2.17e-07) (2.01e-07) (2.01e-07) 
Region of origin (Central Africa)   0.0620   -0.00407   0.00838 
   (0.0559)   (0.0558)   (0.0553) 
Region of origin (Central America)   -0.600***   0.236***   -0.0737 
   (0.0896)   (0.0895)   (0.0887) 
Region of origin (Eastern Asia)   0.759***   0.990***   1.064*** 
   (0.0605)   (0.0604)   (0.0599) 
Region of origin (Eastern Europe)   0.348***   0.304***   0.348*** 
   (0.0311)   (0.0311)   (0.0308) 
Region of origin (Middle East)   -0.136   -0.219*   -0.101 
   (0.130)   (0.130)   (0.129) 
Region of origin (North America)   0.460***   0.397***   0.322*** 
   (0.0436)   (0.0436)   (0.0432) 
Region of origin (Northern Africa)   -0.199*   -0.0850   0.00765 
   (0.119)   (0.119)   (0.118) 
Region of origin (Northern Europe)   0.388***   0.404***   0.246*** 
   (0.0371)   (0.0370)   (0.0367) 
Region of origin (Oceania)   0.447***   0.465***   0.365*** 
   (0.0692)   (0.0691)   (0.0685) 
Region of origin (South America)   0.202   0.0380   0.0185 
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   (0.132)   (0.132)   (0.131) 
Region of origin (Southeast Asia)   0.605***   0.704***   0.666*** 
   (0.0845)   (0.0844)   (0.0837) 
Region of origin (Southern Africa)   0.452***   0.573***   0.389*** 
   (0.106)   (0.106)   (0.105) 
Region of origin (Southern Europe)   -0.149***   -0.194***   -0.0813*** 
   (0.0278)   (0.0278)   (0.0276) 
Region of origin (Western Africa)   -1.360   -1.296   -1.218 
   (0.833)   (0.832)   (0.825) 
Observations 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 
R-squared 0.098 0.267 0.268 0.138 0.273 0.274 0.143 0.288 0.289 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4: The regression results for the nativity gap. 
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4.2. The Institutions 
Typically, the educational outcome of the immigrant population is based on many 
different factors. Apart from the individual, geographical and family characteristics, the 
institutional arrangement of education system in the host countries influences the performance 
of immigrant peers and results in a variation between natives and immigrant peers. 
Immigrant students‟ relative achievement is naturally related to host country‟s school 
starting age. First of all we are interested in the main effect of school starting age on both 
natives and immigrants. The results are summarized in Tables 5, 6, and 7. School starting age 
is controlled with a categorical variable where age 6 is the omitted category. If a student, 
whether she is an immigrant or native, goes to primary school at an early age (school starting 
age<=5), the achievement is decreasing in all three domains of interest.  First column of the 
tables show that starting to primary school in age of 4 or 5 relative to age of 6 results in 0.164 
standard deviation lower score in the math, 0.116 standard deviation lower score in reading. 
Nonetheless, we are not the first one investigating the effect of school starting age on 
immigrant‟s educational achievement. Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) also investigates this issue but 
our study has two distinctions. Firstly, our findings are consistently and intuitively more 
robust since we control for the school characteristics and the region of origin. Secondly, we 
can estimate both the main effects and the specific effects for the immigrant of institutions. 
The interaction between the school starting age and the immigrant dummies are generated to 
carry out an analysis investigating the specific effect of school starting age on the immigrant 
students. At first, the main effects of early school starting age appears a negative factor on the 
achievement of the overall students, however the early school starting age influences the 
achievement of both the 1
st
 generation and 2
nd
 generation immigrants positively. For example, 
the 1
st
 generation immigrant students that start primary school at the age of 5 have higher 
score in the math domain by an amount of 0.419 standard deviation relative to starting age of 
6 (see the column 2 in the Table 7). Moreover, the school starting age of 7 leads to 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Reading 
Score 
Reading 
Score 
Reading 
Score 
Reading 
Score 
Reading 
Score 
Reading 
Score 
       
Second Generation -0.388*** -0.456 -0.447 -0.262 -0.563** -0.482* 
 (0.0222) (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.265) (0.266) 
First Generation -0.351*** -0.342*** -0.364*** -0.352*** -0.300*** -0.303*** 
 (0.0300) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.106) (0.106) 
Length of track -0.00127 -0.000841 -0.00112 -0.00230* -0.00111 -0.00103 
 (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00114) (0.00114) 
Time spent in education system 0.0549*** 0.0503*** 0.0710*** 0.0691*** 0.0990*** 0.0994*** 
 (0.00334) (0.00415) (0.00946) (0.00945) (0.00897) (0.00897) 
Preprimary education 0.0160*** 0.0161*** 0.0164*** 0.0223*** 0.0427*** 0.0423*** 
 (0.00224) (0.00225) (0.00225) (0.00226) (0.00222) (0.00222) 
School starting age≤5 -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.135*** -0.143*** -0.246*** -0.246*** 
 (0.00712) (0.00766) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
School starting age=7 0.310*** 0.317*** 0.337*** 0.319*** 0.383*** 0.385*** 
 (0.00868) (0.00914) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
(School starting age≤5)*(1st generation)  0.335*** 0.348*** 0.327*** 0.379*** 0.363*** 
  (0.0887) (0.0889) (0.0889) (0.0841) (0.0842) 
(School starting age=7)*(1st generation)  -0.383*** -0.388*** -0.337*** -0.395*** -0.398*** 
  (0.0642) (0.0642) (0.0642) (0.0608) (0.0608) 
(School starting age≤5)*(2nd generation)  0.0253 0.0273 0.0382 0.0752 0.0663 
  (0.0748) (0.0748) (0.0747) (0.0707) (0.0707) 
(School starting age=7)*(2nd generation)  -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.134** -0.139*** -0.145*** 
  (0.0548) (0.0548) (0.0548) (0.0519) (0.0519) 
(Preprimary education)*( 1st generation)  0.00879 0.00747 0.00753 0.0290 0.0110 
  (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0392) (0.0398) 
(Preprimary education)*( 2nd generation)  -0.0426 -0.0428 -0.0294 -0.0404 -0.0639** 
  (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0267) (0.0271) 
(Time spent in education system)*(1st gen.)  0.0227*** 0.0266*** 0.0285*** 0.0214*** 0.0190*** 
  (0.00722) (0.00752) (0.00751) (0.00711) (0.00715) 
(Time spent in education system)*(2nd gen.)  0.0482* 0.0473* 0.0302 0.0606** 0.0496* 
  (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0263) (0.0264) 
(Length of track)*(2nd gen.)  -0.0519*** -0.0519*** -0.0440*** -0.0405*** -0.0382*** 
  (0.00976) (0.00976) (0.00975) (0.00924) (0.00925) 
(Length of track)*(1st gen.)  -0.0391*** -0.0392*** -0.0251** -0.0410*** -0.0365*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0121) 
Age of arrival (0,4]   -0.0293* -0.0120 -0.0349** -0.0361** 
   (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
Age of arrival (4,11)   0.0298 0.0627*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 
   (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
Age of arrival [11,13)   0.137** 0.195*** 0.363*** 0.364*** 
   (0.0642) (0.0642) (0.0609) (0.0609) 
Age of arrival [13,16)   0.196** 0.241*** 0.548*** 0.542*** 
   (0.0813) (0.0812) (0.0771) (0.0771) 
Test language at home    0.220*** 0.142*** 0.126*** 
    (0.00735) (0.00696) (0.00747) 
Constant -2.826*** -2.862*** -2.743*** -2.901*** -1.257*** -1.244*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0785) (0.0921) (0.0922) (0.0891) (0.0891) 
       
Observations 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 
R-squared 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.272 0.349 0.349 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for gender, parent‟s highest employment status, age of the student, extensive controls for parental 
socioeconomic status, and region of origins, year, and country level characteristics and school characteristics of the students. 
Table 5: The regression results of institutions in the domain of reading 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Science 
Score 
Science 
Score 
Science 
Score 
Science 
Score 
Science 
Score 
Science 
Score 
       
Second Generation -0.462*** -0.441 -0.432 -0.286 -0.591** -0.497* 
 (0.0221) (0.279) (0.279) (0.279) (0.264) (0.265) 
First Generation -0.391*** -0.182 -0.214* -0.204* -0.186* -0.190* 
 (0.0298) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.106) (0.106) 
Length of track -0.00760*** -0.00702*** -0.00748*** -0.00841*** -0.00635*** -0.00625*** 
 (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.00114) (0.00114) 
Time spent in education system 0.0442*** 0.0386*** 0.0729*** 0.0714*** 0.0968*** 0.0973*** 
 (0.00332) (0.00412) (0.00940) (0.00940) (0.00894) (0.00894) 
Preprimary education 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.138*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 
 (0.00222) (0.00223) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00221) (0.00221) 
School starting age≤5 0.0182** 0.0246*** -0.0135 -0.0204* -0.110*** -0.110*** 
 (0.00708) (0.00762) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
School starting age=7 0.509*** 0.515*** 0.548*** 0.534*** 0.570*** 0.572*** 
 (0.00862) (0.00908) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
(School starting age≤5)*(1st generation)  0.289*** 0.309*** 0.293*** 0.344*** 0.324*** 
  (0.0882) (0.0884) (0.0883) (0.0839) (0.0839) 
(School starting age=7)*(1st generation)  -0.332*** -0.342*** -0.301*** -0.342*** -0.346*** 
  (0.0638) (0.0638) (0.0638) (0.0606) (0.0606) 
(School starting age≤5)*(2nd generation)  -0.0790 -0.0759 -0.0673 -0.0247 -0.0353 
  (0.0743) (0.0743) (0.0743) (0.0705) (0.0705) 
(School starting age=7)*(2nd generation)  -0.262*** -0.260*** -0.234*** -0.233*** -0.240*** 
  (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0517) (0.0517) 
(Preprimary education)*( 1st generation)  -0.0199 -0.0227 -0.0226 0.00171 -0.0230 
  (0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0391) (0.0397) 
(Preprimary education)*( 2nd generation)  -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.141*** -0.150*** -0.178*** 
  (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0266) (0.0270) 
(Time spent in education system)*(1st gen.)  0.0245*** 0.0302*** 0.0317*** 0.0257*** 0.0226*** 
  (0.00718) (0.00747) (0.00747) (0.00709) (0.00712) 
(Time spent in education system)*(2nd gen.)  0.0857*** 0.0847*** 0.0712*** 0.100*** 0.0874*** 
  (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0262) (0.0263) 
(Length of track)*(2nd gen.)  -0.0851*** -0.0849*** -0.0787*** -0.0726*** -0.0700*** 
  (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00970) (0.00921) (0.00923) 
(Length of track)*(1st gen.)  -0.0698*** -0.0700*** -0.0589*** -0.0726*** -0.0666*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0121) 
Age of arrival (0,4]   -0.0412** -0.0276* -0.0510*** -0.0524*** 
   (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Age of arrival (4,11)   0.0492** 0.0752*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 
   (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Age of arrival [11,13)   0.200*** 0.246*** 0.392*** 0.394*** 
   (0.0638) (0.0638) (0.0607) (0.0607) 
Age of arrival [13,16)   0.338*** 0.373*** 0.649*** 0.640*** 
   (0.0808) (0.0808) (0.0768) (0.0768) 
Test language at home    0.174*** 0.0977*** 0.0772*** 
    (0.00730) (0.00694) (0.00745) 
Constant -3.432*** -3.484*** -3.289*** -3.413*** -1.698*** -1.682*** 
 (0.0767) (0.0780) (0.0916) (0.0917) (0.0888) (0.0888) 
       
Observations 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 
R-squared 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.285 0.357 0.357 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for gender, parent‟s highest employment status, age of the student, extensive controls for parental 
socioeconomic status, and region of origins, year, and country level characteristics and school characteristics of the students. 
Table 6: The regression results of institutions in the domain of science 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Math Score Math Score Math Score Math Score Math Score Math Score 
       
Second Generation -0.392*** -0.322 -0.296 -0.198 -0.520** -0.440* 
 (0.0218) (0.276) (0.276) (0.276) (0.259) (0.260) 
First Generation -0.363*** -0.187* -0.234** -0.228** -0.193* -0.196* 
 (0.0295) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.104) (0.104) 
Length of track 0.00610*** 0.00652*** 0.00566*** 0.00503*** 0.00717*** 0.00725*** 
 (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00112) (0.00112) 
Time spent in education system 0.0427*** 0.0444*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00408) (0.00930) (0.00930) (0.00878) (0.00878) 
Preprimary education 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 
 (0.00220) (0.00221) (0.00221) (0.00222) (0.00217) (0.00217) 
School starting age≤5 -0.164*** -0.168*** -0.236*** -0.241*** -0.337*** -0.336*** 
 (0.00700) (0.00754) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
School starting age=7 0.491*** 0.500*** 0.559*** 0.549*** 0.592*** 0.593*** 
 (0.00853) (0.00899) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
(School starting age≤5)*(1st generation)  0.419*** 0.457*** 0.446*** 0.485*** 0.469*** 
  (0.0872) (0.0874) (0.0874) (0.0823) (0.0823) 
(School starting age=7)*(1st generation)  -0.264*** -0.279*** -0.252*** -0.315*** -0.319*** 
  (0.0631) (0.0631) (0.0631) (0.0595) (0.0595) 
(School starting age≤5)*(2nd generation)  -0.00617 0.000402 0.00623 0.0492 0.0405 
  (0.0735) (0.0735) (0.0735) (0.0692) (0.0692) 
(School starting age=7)*(2nd generation)  -0.190*** -0.189*** -0.171*** -0.177*** -0.183*** 
  (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0507) (0.0507) 
(Preprimary education)*( 1st generation)  -0.00634 -0.00769 -0.00766 0.0169 0.000396 
  (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0383) (0.0389) 
(Preprimary education)*( 2nd generation)  -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.166*** -0.172*** -0.195*** 
  (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0261) (0.0265) 
(Time spent in education system)*(1st gen.)  0.00506 0.0104 0.0114 0.00529 0.00307 
  (0.00710) (0.00739) (0.00739) (0.00696) (0.00699) 
(Time spent in education system)*(2nd gen.)  0.0673** 0.0645** 0.0553** 0.0858*** 0.0750*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0257) (0.0258) 
(Length of track)*(2nd gen.)  -0.0510*** -0.0507*** -0.0465*** -0.0402*** -0.0379*** 
  (0.00959) (0.00959) (0.00959) (0.00904) (0.00905) 
(Length of track)*(1st gen.)  -0.0413*** -0.0423*** -0.0348*** -0.0503*** -0.0461*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0118) 
Age of arrival (0,4]   -0.0155 -0.00636 -0.0328** -0.0339** 
   (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
Age of arrival (4,11)   0.0903*** 0.108*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 
   (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0218) (0.0218) 
Age of arrival [11,13)   0.415*** 0.446*** 0.599*** 0.600*** 
   (0.0632) (0.0632) (0.0595) (0.0595) 
Age of arrival [13,16)   0.574*** 0.597*** 0.886*** 0.880*** 
   (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0754) (0.0754) 
Test language at home    0.117*** 0.0385*** 0.0224*** 
    (0.00723) (0.00681) (0.00731) 
Constant -3.814*** -3.810*** -3.463*** -3.547*** -1.736*** -1.724*** 
 (0.0759) (0.0772) (0.0906) (0.0907) (0.0871) (0.0871) 
       
Observations 515,087 515,087 515,087 515,087 514,379 514,379 
R-squared 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.302 0.382 0.382 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for gender, parent‟s highest employment status, age of the student, extensive controls for parental 
socioeconomic status, and region of origins, year, and country level characteristics and school characteristics of the students. 
Table 7:  The regression results of institutions in the domain of math 
 
 
a decrease of a 0.264 standard deviation in math score with reference to the column 2 in 
the Table 7 relative to age of 6. In the same way, this patterns hold in both science and 
reading scores even though we control for the factors of language, age of arrival to the host 
country and school characteristics. Moreover, the findings are the same in the case of 2
nd
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generation immigrants. For instance, with reference to the column 2 in the Table 5 if a second 
generation migrant student starts primary school at the age of 7 the outcome of this student in 
reading decreases by 0.168 standard deviation relative to native peers starting age of 7. Apart 
from reading scores, the same tendency holds in two other domains of interest in spite of 
controlling for language, age of arrival to host country and school characteristics. The 
intuition behind this relies on the fact that early school starting age mitigates the effect of 
disadvantaged parental backgrounds for several reasons. In Early entry may also help 
immigrants increase cognitive capacities and expose the children to the educational system of 
the host country and this finding is consistent with the previous literature Currie and Thomas 
(1999), Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) and Heckman (2006). 
In addition to the school starting age, we are interested in the effect of preprimary education 
on the student achievements. One extra year preprimary education increases math scores of an 
average student by a 0.161 standard deviation (see the column 1 in the Table 7), 0.132 
standard deviation in the case of science scores (see the column 1 in the Table 6) and 0.0160 
standard deviation in the case of reading scores (see the column 1 in the Table 5). The main 
effect of the preprimary education for both natives and the immigrants are still in the same 
direction and statistically significant in all three domains of interest when we control for 
language, age of arrival to host country and school characteristics. On the whole, these 
findings for the effect of preprimary education are consistent with the previous literature 
Schneeweis (2010), Datar (2006), Lubotsky (2009), Curie (2001) and Deming et al. (2008). 
However, we also generate the interaction of the preprimary education variable with the 
immigration status. We find no additional effect for the 1
st
 generation immigrant students. For 
the scores of 2
nd
 generation immigrant students, however, interaction term indicates a 
negative influence in both the science and math sections. Moreover, there is no effect on the 
reading scores of the 2
nd
 generation immigrants since the coefficient is statistically significant. 
The total effect which is the sum of main and interaction effect are positive or slightly 
negative for the immigrants. For instance, the 1
st
 generation immigrants in reading scores 
benefit from preprimary education when we consider the Tables 5, 6 and 7 with reference to 
the column 2. However, the preprimary education is affecting the 2
nd
 generation immigrants 
negatively (see the column 2 in the Table 5, 6 and 7). The intuition behind this fact may be 
that these immigrants do not have access to preprimary education or that they drop out for 
several reasons. 
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It is popularly believed that the preprimary education increases the educational outcome of the 
immigrant students for several reasons such as increasing language skills and cognitive skills 
especially for the 2
nd
 generation immigrants. Nonetheless, our data for preprimary education 
is at the country level and therefore we do not exactly know whether the immigrants attend to 
preprimary education for all three waves of data used in the analysis. Luckily, the PISA 2003 
and 2009 have the data on preprimary attendance of students and thus we can use this variable 
instead of using a country level variable. Although the results are same for the 1
st
 generation 
immigrant, for the 2
nd
 generation immigrants the negative interaction terms positive 
insignificant for math and science but significant for reading as shown in Tables 8, 9 and 10 
with reference to the column 2 for all tables. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Science Score Science Score Science Score Science Score Science Score 
      
Second Generation -0.139 -1.840*** -1.106* -0.935 -1.213** 
 (0.0880) (0.584) (0.593) (0.593) (0.567) 
First Generation -0.133 -0.444*** -0.0238 -0.0572 0.0423 
 (0.0866) (0.104) (0.131) (0.131) (0.126) 
Length of track -0.000472 -5.97e-05 -0.000451 -0.00119 0.00314** 
 (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00147) 
School starting age≤5 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.0516*** 
 (0.00883) (0.00943) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0151) 
School starting age=7 0.498*** 0.502*** 0.520*** 0.506*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0155) 
Preprimary education attendance in years 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.0910*** 
 (0.00305) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00301) 
Time spent in education system 0.0340*** 0.0267*** 0.0431*** 0.0411*** 0.0614*** 
 (0.00428) (0.00521) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0119) 
Time spent in education system)*(1st gen.)  0.0222** 0.0247** 0.0267*** 0.0264*** 
  (0.00939) (0.00985) (0.00985) (0.00940) 
(Time spent in education system)*(2nd gen.)  0.179*** 0.135** 0.116* 0.157*** 
  (0.0615) (0.0620) (0.0620) (0.0593) 
(Preprimary education)*( 2nd generation)  0.000130 0.0252 0.0229 0.0200 
  (0.0351) (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0337) 
(Preprimary education)*( 1st generation)  0.127*** 0.0735** 0.0617* 0.0916*** 
  (0.0336) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0328) 
(School starting age≤5)*(1st generation)  0.369*** -0.0836 -0.0720 -0.0185 
  (0.0801) (0.127) (0.126) (0.121) 
(School starting age=7)*(1st generation)  -0.595*** -0.405*** -0.376*** -0.443*** 
  (0.0735) (0.0750) (0.0750) (0.0716) 
(School starting age≤5)*(2nd generation)  0.134 -0.217 -0.180 -0.213 
  (0.127) (0.160) (0.160) (0.153) 
(School starting age=7)*(2nd generation)  -0.177** -0.0914 -0.0890 -0.119 
  (0.0819) (0.0840) (0.0840) (0.0803) 
Length of track)*(2nd gen.)  -0.0792*** -0.0740*** -0.0692*** -0.0768*** 
  (0.0153) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0168) 
(Length of track)*(1st gen.)  -0.0430*** -0.0802*** -0.0718*** -0.0834*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0133) 
Age of arrival (0,4]   -0.00962 0.00138 -0.0490** 
   (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0201) 
Age of arrival (4,11)   0.0697** 0.0897*** 0.127*** 
   (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0289) 
Age of arrival [11,13)   0.0895 0.125 0.242*** 
   (0.0831) (0.0831) (0.0794) 
Age of arrival [13,16)   0.131 0.163 0.391*** 
   (0.105) (0.105) (0.100) 
Test language at home    0.144*** 0.0627*** 
    (0.00950) (0.00909) 
Constant -3.064*** -3.111*** -3.031*** -3.136*** -1.560*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0980) (0.117) (0.117) (0.114) 
      
Observations 328,401 328,401 328,401 328,401 328,401 
R-squared 0.273 0.273 0.274 0.274 0.340 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for gender, parent‟s highest employment status, age of the student, extensive controls for parental 
socioeconomic status, and region of origins, year, and country level characteristics and school characteristics of the students. 
Table 8: The regression results of new preprimary variable in the domain of science 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Math Score Math Score Math Score Math Score Math Score 
      
Second Generation -0.0943 -1.059* -0.506 -0.416 -0.702 
 (0.0872) (0.578) (0.587) (0.587) (0.558) 
First Generation -0.125 -0.315*** 0.0365 0.0189 0.146 
 (0.0858) (0.103) (0.130) (0.130) (0.123) 
Length of track 0.0165*** 0.0168*** 0.0162*** 0.0158*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00145) 
School starting age≤5 -0.0440*** -0.0407*** -0.0779*** -0.0794*** -0.135*** 
 (0.00875) (0.00934) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0148) 
School starting age=7 0.455*** 0.462*** 0.495*** 0.488*** 0.554*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0152) 
Preprimary education attendance in years 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.126*** 
 (0.00302) (0.00305) (0.00305) (0.00305) (0.00296) 
Time spent in education system 0.0363*** 0.0348*** 0.0673*** 0.0663*** 0.0876*** 
 (0.00424) (0.00516) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0117) 
Time spent in education system)*(1st gen.)  0.00652 0.00444 0.00550 0.00493 
  (0.00930) (0.00976) (0.00976) (0.00925) 
(Time spent in education system)*(2nd gen.)  0.0910 0.0613 0.0511 0.0950 
  (0.0609) (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0583) 
(Preprimary education)*( 2nd generation)  -0.00756 0.0186 0.0173 0.00736 
  (0.0348) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0332) 
(Preprimary education)*( 1st generation)  0.0509 0.00444 -0.00176 0.0269 
  (0.0333) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0323) 
(School starting age≤5)*(1st generation)  0.624*** 0.188 0.194 0.242** 
  (0.0793) (0.125) (0.125) (0.119) 
(School starting age=7)*(1st generation)  -0.566*** -0.401*** -0.386*** -0.476*** 
  (0.0728) (0.0743) (0.0743) (0.0705) 
(School starting age≤5)*(2nd generation)  0.490*** 0.0925 0.112 0.0777 
  (0.126) (0.158) (0.158) (0.150) 
(School starting age=7)*(2nd generation)  -0.184** -0.115 -0.114 -0.158** 
  (0.0811) (0.0832) (0.0832) (0.0789) 
Length of track)*(2nd gen.)  -0.0315** -0.0342* -0.0316* -0.0402** 
  (0.0152) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0165) 
(Length of track)*(1st gen.)  -0.00139 -0.0379*** -0.0334** -0.0476*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0131) 
Age of arrival (0,4]   0.0201 0.0259 -0.0294 
   (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0197) 
Age of arrival (4,11)   0.103*** 0.114*** 0.153*** 
   (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0285) 
Age of arrival [11,13)   0.226*** 0.245*** 0.367*** 
   (0.0823) (0.0823) (0.0781) 
Age of arrival [13,16)   0.254** 0.271*** 0.508*** 
   (0.104) (0.104) (0.0985) 
Test language at home    0.0760*** -0.00714 
    (0.00941) (0.00894) 
Constant -3.412*** -3.415*** -3.242*** -3.298*** -1.670*** 
 (0.0953) (0.0971) (0.116) (0.116) (0.112) 
      
Observations 328,401 328,401 328,401 328,401 328,401 
R-squared 0.283 0.282 0.283 0.283 0.358 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for gender, parent‟s highest employment status, age of the student, extensive controls for parental 
socioeconomic status, and region of origins, year, and country level characteristics and school characteristics of the students. 
Table 9: The regression results of new preprimary variable in the domain of math 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Reading Score Reading Score Reading Score Reading Score Reading Score 
      
Second Generation -0.108 -1.075* -0.493 -0.245 -0.568 
 (0.0883) (0.586) (0.595) (0.594) (0.567) 
First Generation -0.166* -0.515*** -0.180 -0.228* -0.0823 
 (0.0868) (0.104) (0.132) (0.132) (0.125) 
Length of track -0.00288* -0.00243 -0.00280* -0.00388** 0.000394 
 (0.00153) (0.00153) (0.00154) (0.00153) (0.00147) 
School starting age≤5 -0.102*** -0.0923*** -0.112*** -0.116*** -0.177*** 
 (0.00886) (0.00945) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0150) 
School starting age=7 0.303*** 0.306*** 0.323*** 0.304*** 0.383*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0154) 
Preprimary education attendance in years 0.0390*** 0.0371*** 0.0376*** 0.0412*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.00306) (0.00309) (0.00309) (0.00309) (0.00300) 
Time spent in education system 0.0511*** 0.0440*** 0.0605*** 0.0577*** 0.0816*** 
 (0.00429) (0.00523) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0119) 
Time spent in education system)*(1st gen.)  0.0281*** 0.0301*** 0.0330*** 0.0312*** 
  (0.00942) (0.00988) (0.00988) (0.00939) 
(Time spent in education system)*(2nd 
gen.) 
 0.0832 0.0465 0.0185 0.0683 
  (0.0617) (0.0622) (0.0621) (0.0592) 
(Preprimary education)*( 2nd generation)  0.0431 0.0699** 0.0665* 0.0522 
  (0.0352) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0337) 
(Preprimary education)*( 1st generation)  0.167*** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.123*** 
  (0.0337) (0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0328) 
(School starting age≤5)*(1st generation)  0.538*** 0.161 0.178 0.237** 
  (0.0803) (0.127) (0.127) (0.121) 
(School starting age=7)*(1st generation)  -0.592*** -0.410*** -0.367*** -0.461*** 
  (0.0737) (0.0753) (0.0752) (0.0716) 
(School starting age≤5)*(2nd generation)  0.467*** 0.179 0.234 0.186 
  (0.128) (0.160) (0.160) (0.152) 
(School starting age=7)*(2nd generation)  -0.186** -0.0998 -0.0964 -0.138* 
  (0.0821) (0.0843) (0.0842) (0.0802) 
Length of track)*(2nd gen.)  -0.0297* -0.0246 -0.0175 -0.0298* 
  (0.0154) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0168) 
(Length of track)*(1st gen.)  -0.0371*** -0.0728*** -0.0605*** -0.0749*** 
  (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0133) 
Age of arrival (0,4]   -0.00379 0.0122 -0.0374* 
   (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0200) 
Age of arrival (4,11)   0.0583* 0.0873*** 0.129*** 
   (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0289) 
Age of arrival [11,13)   0.105 0.156* 0.288*** 
   (0.0833) (0.0833) (0.0793) 
Age of arrival [13,16)   0.132 0.179* 0.430*** 
   (0.105) (0.105) (0.100) 
Test language at home    0.209*** 0.122*** 
    (0.00953) (0.00908) 
Constant -2.658*** -2.701*** -2.617*** -2.769*** -1.254*** 
 (0.0965) (0.0983) (0.118) (0.118) (0.114) 
      
Observations 328,401 328,401 328,401 328,401 328,401 
R-squared 0.261 0.260 0.261 0.262 0.334 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for gender, parent‟s highest employment status, age of the student, extensive controls for parental 
socioeconomic status, and region of origins, year, and country level characteristics and school characteristics of the students. 
Table 10: The regression results of new preprimary variable in the domain of reading 
 
Moreover, these results are robust when we control for family background, language and 
school characteristics. Taking everything into account, it is likely that the preprimary 
education in the host country is a crucial factor on the achievement of immigrant students, a 
conclusion which differentiates our study from the previous literature that do not study this 
institutional arrangement such as Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), Dronkers and Velden (2012), Horn 
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(2012), Ludemann and Schwerdt (2010), Entorf and Miniou (2005), Schnepf (2007) and 
Schneeweis (2010). 
The existence of tracking in the system as an institutional structure may also affect the 
achievement of students. With the intention of investigating the effect of tracking system we 
generate a track variable containing the time that a student spends in a track until the age of 
15. One advantage of considering the total time spent in a track is that of observing the 
continuing permanent effect of tracking due to initial selection in time. Initially, the previous 
literature such as Waldinger (2006), Schuetz et al. (2008), Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), Horn 
(2012), and Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) considers the age of selection or early age of 
selection that ignores the time effect of tracking. Therefore, we carry out our analysis by using 
the time spent in a track. To put it another way, our expectation for the track variable is that 
the longer time the student spends in a track the larger will be the effects of track.  
Considering the regression results in Table 5, 6 and 7 for the column 1, the main effect of 
tracking is positive not considering the immigration status of a student. If a student spends 
one extra year in a track, the score in the math section is relatively a 0.00610 standard 
deviation higher (see the column1 in Table 7). In addition, taking into account family 
background, language and school characteristics, and the positive effect of spending one extra 
year in a track is still valid. In the science performance, the tracking has a negative effect even 
after we control for other variables. Interestingly, tracking has no significant effect on reading 
performance of a student with reference to the column1 in the Table 5. However when we 
control for the language variable it has a negative effect. While it is true to say that tracking 
has no consistent affect in all three domains of interest, in fact it results in a penalty for the 
immigrants in all domains. When we generate the interaction between the track variable and 
the status of immigration, we reach a conclusion that spending an extra one year in any track 
for both the 1
st
 generation and the 2
nd
 generation immigrants affects negatively their 
performance relative to the native ones. This effect of tracking on the immigrant population is 
consistent and statistically significant even after controlling for family background, language 
and school characteristics. According to Table 7, being a 2
nd
 generation immigrant results in a 
0.00510 lower standard deviation performance in math and the penalty for being a 1
st
 
generation immigrant is a 0.0413 lower standard deviation performance in the same domain. 
The trend in math performance for the immigrant is the same in both the reading and the 
science performance. That is to say, with reference to Table 5, 6 and 7 if a student is a 1
st
 
generation immigrant then this student is exposed to a 0.0365 standard deviation penalty in 
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reading and a 0.0666 lower standard deviation score in science after controlling for family 
background, language and school characteristics. Moreover, the 2
nd
 generation immigrant 
performs 0.0382 standard deviation lower in the reading domain and 0.07 standard deviation 
lower in science by controlling for family background, language and school characteristics 
(see Table 5 and 6). Unlike the previous studies of Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) claiming that the 
limited tracking
10
 on ability is advantageous for the immigrant students. Our results for 
tracking reveals that the inequality between the immigrant and the natives increases as time 
spent in track increases and this result is robust to controlling school, family and language 
variables. The reason why we get a different result from Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) is that they 
use a different tracking measure focusing on the ability grouping
11
 in the current school. 
However, we are interested in the effect of previous tracking mechanism on the current school 
success of a student. In addition, Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) investigates the effect of age of first 
selection which is a different construction of our tracking measure. Our results are consistent 
with their findings and more robust since after controlling for several variables such as school 
characteristics it is still significant.  Our results reveal that tracking increases the inequality 
between immigrant and native students against the immigrant in education. The intuition 
behind this relies on the fact that immigrants are more likely to fall in lower tracks for several 
reasons. For instance, the lower family background conditions of immigrants relative to 
natives and lack of language ability in the host country results in lower tracks for immigrant 
students. Moreover, the family background effect for the immigrant students can increase the 
negative effects of tracking on them in the time of tracking as discussed in the previous 
literature Ludemann and Schwerdt (2010), Horn (2012), and Brunello and Checchi(2007)).  
The previous selection -tracking in our study- makes the students in lower tracks deprived of 
sufficient science or math education for several reasons. For instance, in Turkey the students 
that drop into vocational track suffer from insufficient science and math education. As a 
result, the time spent in the tracking may increase the gap between the natives and immigrants 
because of the reason as in the case of Turkey. Therefore, the lower track schools may not be 
as efficient as the higher track schools to educate the immigrant students. As a result, the 
immigrant students may have lower scores. In our data set, the 1
st
 generation immigrant 
students have different age of arrival to host country. As a consequence, the familiarity of 
                                                          
10
 Ability grouping in current school for some subjects. 
11
 We also control for ability grouping and the effect of ability grouping for both all subjects 
and some subjects is negative unlike the positive effect for some subjects in Cobb-Clark et al. 
(2012). This difference may be based on the fact that we control for the school resources  and 
other institutional arrangements related to previous selection of students. 
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these students and their families to the host country‟s educational structure may vary by age 
of arrival. The familiarity to the educational structure may force the parents to be active in 
their educational investment for their siblings. Particularly, a parent may send her sibling to 
some special courses for her child to decrease the negative effect of tracking or to settle her 
child into a high quality school. In addition, we expect that the more years a student spends in 
the education system the more the student performs since the more years increase the 
adaptation of the student to the host country education system. With the purpose of 
understanding the effect of familiarity we carry out an analysis including a variable that 
indicates how many years a student spends in the educational system of a host country. The 
results are summarized in Table 5, 6 and 7. First of all, the main effect of staying one extra 
year in the education system is positive in all domains of interest (see the column 1 for all 
tables). For instance, the increase due to staying one extra year in the education system is a 
0.0427 standard deviation in math, a 0.0549 standard deviation in reading and 0.0442 in 
science. The findings are robust when we control for family background, language and school 
characteristics. Secondly, the specific effect of staying one extra in the education of host 
country for the immigrants is positive. In other words the immigrant peers benefit more than 
the native born peers in general. For the 1
st
 generation immigrant students, spending one extra 
year in the host country‟s education system increases their performance by 0.0227 standard 
deviation in reading and 0.0245 standard deviation in science however there is not significant 
effect in math score (see the column 2 for all tables). Regardless of the fact that there is no 
effect in reading for the 1
st
 generation immigrant students, the total effect of staying in a host 
country‟s education system leads to a 0.149 standard deviation increase in reading and 0.119 
in science respectively. In brief, 1
st
 generation immigrants benefit more from spending more 
time in the host country‟s education system relative to the native born peers even when we 
control for family background, language and school characteristics (see Table 5, 6 and 7). 
Furthermore, the effect of staying one extra year in a host country‟s education system leads to 
additional increase in all domains for 2
nd
 generation immigrant students. Indeed, 2
nd
 
generation immigrant students relative to native-born counterparts perform better in all three 
sections as shown in Table 5, 6 and 7. For example, the 2
nd
 generation immigrant students 
perform a 0.0673 standard deviation more in math scores relative to native-born counterparts 
(see the column 2 in the Table 7). Moreover this finding is still robust and significant while 
controlling the school characteristic and language variable. The same pattern is valid in 
science and reading scores as summarized in Table 5 and 6. As a result, staying more in the 
education system of a host country increases the performance of immigrant students and they 
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benefit more than the native born ones. Thus the inequality between the immigrant and the 
natives decreases. To sum up, our findings suggest that the gap between the immigrants and 
native students as well as for better integration of immigrants to host countries may be 
decreased to minimum level if the host countries consider more preprimary education, early 
school starting age and more comprehensive education system in their education system.  As a 
result, the importance of our study is that how a host country increases the education 
outcomes of immigrant students by revising its education system. 
4.3 Age of arrival, Language and Country Specific Characteristics 
Although our main interest in this study is to understand the role of educational 
institutions on the educational achievement of immigrant population, we also conduct our 
analysis to measure the effect of school characteristics, language spoken at home, age of 
arrival to host country and some country development indices.  First of all, the age of arrival 
to a host country is one of the major indicators of educational achievements for immigrant 
students, with the best results observed at age 11, which is intuitive from the psychology 
literature. Initially, one may expect that the scores should be higher as the age of arrival 
decreases. However, the age of arrival both includes familiarity to the educational system 
argument and language ability thus the language ability component may be the dominant over 
the institutional and environmental familiarity. In fact, the psychology literature talks about 
“critical period” for second language ability. Snow et al. (1978) argue that the period of age of 
12-15 is the most efficient time to learn a second language. By controlling for school start age 
our findings support this argument since our results show that the age of arrival of 11 and 
higher increases the scores. However, the effect of age of arrival turns to reverse direction –
negative effect on scores- if we do not control for the school starting age. One potential 
explanation may be that the language ability is hidden in the age of arrival as in the case of 
Snow et al. (1978). The second explanation may be the fact that immigrants do not have 
sufficient information about the educational system in a host country. Controlling for school 
start age may represent knowledge of educational system and therefore the language 
hypothesis of Snow et al. (1978) occurs in our results. 
Likewise, speaking the host country‟s language at home increases the performance of 
the migrants relative to ones who do not speak as shown in Table 5, 6 and 7. Another crucial 
finding is that all students, whether migrant or not, perform higher in the schools with higher 
average family background (summarized in Table 11). 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Math Score Science Score Reading Score 
    
Vocational School -0.263*** -0.261*** -0.254*** 
 (0.00359) (0.00366) (0.00367) 
School FB mean 0.596*** 0.556*** 0.582*** 
 (0.00275) (0.00280) (0.00281) 
School standard deviation FB 0.00723 -0.0277*** 0.0140* 
 (0.00755) (0.00770) (0.00772) 
Student-teacher ratio -0.00163*** -0.00173*** -0.00141*** 
 (0.000159) (0.000163) (0.000163) 
Teacher shortage -0.0245*** -0.0158*** -0.0187*** 
 (0.00127) (0.00129) (0.00130) 
Responsibility for curriculum & assessment index -0.0175*** -0.0277*** -0.0235*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00127) (0.00127) 
Shortage of instruction material (very little) -0.0130*** -0.0167*** 0.00523* 
 (0.00282) (0.00287) (0.00288) 
Shortage of instruction material (to some extent) -0.0232*** -0.0450*** -0.0232*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00340) (0.00341) 
Shortage of instruction material (A lot) -0.00242 -0.0136** -0.000178 
 (0.00539) (0.00550) (0.00551) 
School type (Private-Government) 0.116*** 0.0921*** 0.125*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00486) (0.00487) 
School type (Public) 0.0797*** 0.0839*** 0.114*** 
 (0.00384) (0.00392) (0.00393) 
Ability Grouping (For Some Subject) -0.0736*** -0.0643*** -0.0601*** 
 (0.00274) (0.00279) (0.00280) 
Ability Grouping (For All Subject) -0.0670*** -0.0769*** -0.0533*** 
 (0.00334) (0.00341) (0.00342) 
Human Development Index 0.0591*** 0.0517*** 0.0432*** 
 (0.00133) (0.00136) (0.00136) 
Gini -0.127*** -0.0507*** -0.163*** 
 (0.00301) (0.00307) (0.00308) 
Teacher pupil ratio 0.0139*** 0.00913*** 0.00515*** 
 (0.000748) (0.000763) (0.000765) 
Public expenditure on education percent of GDP -0.0184*** -0.119*** 0.0392*** 
 (0.00361) (0.00368) (0.00369) 
Teacher salary 1.02e-05*** 5.26e-06*** 1.08e-05*** 
 (2.08e-07) (2.12e-07) (2.13e-07) 
Constant -1.736*** -1.698*** -1.257*** 
 (0.0871) (0.0888) (0.0891) 
    
Observations 515,087 515,087 515,087 
R-squared 0.382 0.357 0.349 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for gender, parent‟s highest employment status, age of the student, extensive controls for parental 
socioeconomic status, and region of origins, year, and institutional arrangements and status of immigration, and age of arrival and language. 
Table 11: The regression results for school characteristics and country level variables 
 
Students in vocational schools have lower scores than students attending general 
schools which may be intuitive due to the reasons of low educational resources. As the 
student teacher ratio increases the performance of a student decreases because the 
instructional efficiency probably decreases. Likewise, this argument is valid for the shortage 
of instructional materials in a school as this hurts the performance of the students. What is 
more, the ability grouping in a school relative to no ability grouping leads to lower scores as 
the intensity of ability grouping increases. With reference to (Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) and 
Korthals (2012)), this finding is consistent with the previous studies. 
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Finally, students perform better in the countries where HDI, teacher-pupil ratio, 
teacher salary and public expenditure on education percent of GDP is high. However, they 
perform worse in the countries where the Gini coefficient is higher. Therefore, the educational 
achievement of both immigrant and native students is related to the wider social context as in 
the case of Gini coefficient findings as suggested in Schneeweis(2010). 
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5. Conclusion 
We observe substantial heterogeneity in the educational achievement of immigrant 
students in OECD countries. Our goal in this study is to explain the reasons for this variation 
therefore we conduct an empirical analysis by using three waves of PISA tests. Our main 
consideration is that how much the role of institutional arrangement in the host countries is 
responsible of the variation in the educational achievement of immigrant population. While 
most of the literature on educational achievement of immigrant students is concerned with the 
causal effects of the institutional arrangements in the education system of host countries, they 
ignore the difference between the immigrants across countries due to their region of origin. 
We contribute the literature in the following two ways: firstly, we control the region of origin 
for the immigrant students and explain the cross-country difference between the immigrant 
groups by using the region of origin fixed effects. For instance, the tracking has no effect on 
1
st
 generation immigrants if we do not control for region of origin. However, if we control for 
region of origin the tracking has negative significant effect on immigrants. Secondly, we use 
in this study more comprehensive measure of institutional arrangements. In particular we 
generate new measures taking into account familiarity to host country‟s education system and 
time spent in an institutional arrangement. Moreover, we also control for school 
characteristics and how children are allocated to schools. 
We find that achievement gaps are wider for the immigrant students in the host 
countries where the school starting age is late. The early starting school age is beneficial for 
both the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 generation immigrant students after controlling for school characteristics, 
language and region of origins. This finding is intuitively consistent owing to the fact that the 
early starting school age is increasing the cognitive and language abilities of the immigrant 
students. Moreover, the inequality between the immigrants and native-born counterparts 
decreases if the expected duration of preprimary education increases. The investigation of the 
effects of preprimary education on immigrant students is one of the contributions of this 
study. The tracking system results in the increase of inequality between the immigrant and 
native students. In other words the more the longer is the duration of track the more the 
immigrant student underperforms relative to native ones. We also find that the time spent in 
the educational system of a host country is a crucial determinant on the achievement of 
immigrant students and it affects their performance positively. This result suggests that 
performance of immigrants increase as familiarity with educational system increases. The gap 
between immigrants and natives is increasing if the age of arrival to host country increases. 
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Thus, the emigration in early ages for immigrant students is beneficial for their educational 
performance. In addition, the language spoken at home has also notable effect on the 
immigrant performance as well as country specific effects such as HDI, education spending, 
pupil-teacher ratio and teacher salary rates. However, the income inequality harms the 
performance of immigrant students. 
Based on the findings of our study policymakers should take into account the 
institutional arrangements in education for the integration of immigrants to the host country. 
In particular, the school starting age, tracking and preprimary education can be rearranged to 
mitigate the negative effects of institutional arrangements on immigrant students.  All in all, 
the immigrant students may benefit from the education system in host countries if the 
education system of these host countries has the structure of more preprimary education, early 
school starting age and more comprehensive educational arrangements rather than including 
tracking. 
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Appendix A: Distribution of the institutional arrangements and country level variables 
COUNTRY Duration of 
expected 
preprimary 
education 
Time spent 
in a track 
Primary School 
Starting Age 
Gini HDI Public 
expenditure for 
health (% GDP) 
Employment 
ratio 
Education 
index 
Pupil-
teacher 
ratio 
Education share  in 
government expenditure 
Public expenditure for 
education (% GDP) 
Teacher 
salary 
Australia 1.64434 0.0343839 5 5.5667 62.3 61.4333 0.9803 0.978 23.7 14.176 4.7488 47445 
Austria 2.32851 5.82726 6 7.8 58.6333 57.3 0.8507 0.8217 18.9 11.0514 5.4113 40818 
Belgium 2.98341 3.854408 6 7.2 53.4667 52.7667 0.8863 0.8757 11.6294 12.2675 6.0852 44076 
Canada 1.566 0.0552045 6 6.8667 62.9333 63.3667 0.9087 0.9107 17.416 12.3 4.8737 54978 
Czech Rep. 2.40113 4.864321 6 5.8333 60.1333 60.2333 0.9203 0.921 17.1403 9.8397 4.1161 19949 
Denmark 2.74448 0.0231036 7 8.1 61.6667 63.2 0.9177 0.913 10.0276 15.3751 7.9404 50253 
Estonia 2.669 0.8102749 7 3.8333 58.7667 61.6333 0.9177 0.92 12.7995 14.2312 5.0695 12576 
Finland 2.22858 0.016841 7 6.0333 58.7 58.9 0.8783 0.8787 15.6614 12.5294 6.1215 37455 
Germany 2.77993 5.82286 6 8 56.2667 54.3667 0.937 0.9237 14.199 10.1235 4.4956 55771 
Greece 1.40482 0.7072798 6 5.9 52.5667 52.6 0.853 0.8503 11.7194 9.2236 4.0911 32387 
Hungary 2.61203 4.724611 7 5.6667 49.9333 51.1 0.8887 0.8837 10.3056 10.5389 5.3218 13228 
Iceland 2.87785 0.0206788 6 7.6667 72.6333 75.2667 0.9077 0.8937 17.8 17.7877 7.5141 27930 
Ireland 1.69395 0.7037104 4 5.8 58.5667 62.3667 0.9617 0.9467 17.9257 13.7069 4.9991 53677 
Italy 2.92354 1.734035 6 6.6667 47.9667 48.2667 0.8473 0.8307 10.6333 9.313 4.4852 32658 
Japan 2.69328 0.7869273 6 6.5667 59.8333 60.4 0.883 0.8707 19.356 9.4518 3.4626 44788 
Korea 2.38844 1.742143 6 3.2333 64.9667 65.6667 0.9343 0.911 28.7487 15.2696 4.3493 46338 
Luxembourg 2.57936 2.822874 6 6.1667 58.7667 57.5667 0.776 0.7713 11.49 9.8215 3.7452 95043 
Mexico 2.45474 3.719487 6 2.6 63.9 64.1333 0.7123 0.68 27.6088 21.5928 4.8693 18621 
Netherlands 1.98824 3.723033 6 6.8667 63.0333 61.8333 0.9283 0.9043 23.9 11.9427 5.4268 50621 
New Zealand 2.82496 0.0339614 5 6.9667 66.6333 66.9 0.998 0.9913 16.7761 17.2742 6.0263 41009 
Norway 2.835 0.0398324 6 7.2333 66.4 65.1667 0.9873 0.9947 19.3 16.3565 6.63 35991 
Poland 1.41875 0.0215615 7 4.3 55.4333 52.2 0.816 0.8103 11.1918 11.9931 5.1788 15186 
Portugal 2.36845 0.7876182 6 6.7333 60.0667 61.2 0.7357 0.7073 11.561 11.2863 5.0696 37542 
Slovakia 2.21206 4.756228 6 5.1 58.3333 57.0667 0.8677 0.8537 17.6812 10.3347 3.721 12688 
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Slovenia 2.325 1.723563 6 5.8 59 59.6 0.9343 0.9263 14.6285 12.3234 5.4345 32436 
Spain 2.95631 0.060231 6 5.9 52 54.3667 0.8637 0.8367 13.6943 11.111 4.363 42846 
Sweden 2.73377 0.0246262 7 7.2667 62.5667 62.6333 0.9087 0.9077 10.5972 12.7754 6.7362 33374 
Switzerland 1.42232 3.7983 7 6.4667 66.0333 65.0667 0.867 0.8557 20.2 16.3161 5.2363 70784 
Turkey 0.7117 4.873262 6 3.9333 46.3 45.8667 0.6 0.573 25.6 9.4 2.8625 24761 
United 
Kingdom 
2.78477 0.02045 5 6.8333 59.3 59.8333 0.822 0.808 17.7436 11.6228 5.4387 44145 
USA 1.6717 0.0488934 6 7 62.2 64.5333 0.9887 0.974 14.414 14.0951 5.4635 45226 
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